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Testing Potential Fish Fraud in Community-Supported Fisheries
UVM Honors College Senior Thesis
By Ryan Tartre
Abstract
The seafood industry has long been plagued by the substitution of a species under a false
label. Seafood mislabeling is a major concern in the management of fish and marine species.
Incorrect labels hamper the ability to estimate stock size effectively, reduce consumer choice,
and represent potential health hazards. The rates of seafood fraudulence have been shown to
differ across businesses and markets, and in recent years, community-supported fishery programs
(CSFs) have sprung up as an alternative to fish markets and grocery stores. Using genetic
analysis, I show that 17 out of 41 (41.5%) samples examined from multiple markets in New
Hampshire and Maine were fraudulent. The rates of fraudulent labeling differed across species
and across markets, with community-supported fishery programs having the lowest levels of
fraud (3 out of 10 samples, 30%) followed by restaurants (33%), fish markets (44%), sushi
restaurants (50%) and grocery stores (58%). While the different levels of fraudulence between
CSFs and other markets were not found to be statistically significant (p=0.36), my findings
should warrant future studies with a larger sample of CSFs to determine the extent to which
CSFs can help reduce seafood fraudulence.

1.0 Introduction
1.1 Seafood Fraud
The seafood industry in the United States brings in roughly $90 billion annually and supports
over 1.5 million jobs (Kearney et al. 2014). The net worth is dependent on a wide range of
species advertised and chosen by consumers. While labels largely function to provide
information on the species to the consumer, they also serve to standardize labelling through
chains of production, enforce different safety standards per species, help facilitate conservation
efforts, and avoid the illicit trade of species (Miller, 2010). The need for effective labels has
become increasingly important considering a UN report by the Food and Agriculture
Organization, which suggested that the sale of illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries
contributes to overfishing (FAO, 2007). Additionally, much literature has been written on the
difficulty of managing fisheries, (Gaines and Costello, 2013, Roughgarden and Smith, 1996) but
until recently the effect of IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated) fishing on the reduction of
key species has been largely overlooked (Pauly, 2003, EFTEC, 2008). In 2008 alone IUU fishing
was estimated at 11-26 million tons with a loss of $10-23.5 billion globally. This is a hefty
global fraction of the $80 billion in total revenue of legal fishing in 2008 (Oliver, 2008).
Labels, however, are only effective in-so-far as they are accurate. Consumers rely on seafood
labels so they can know the product they are buying. However, there are instances in which the
species depicted by the label differs from the fish it is labeling, constituting seafood or fish

fraudulence. There are many reasons why a fish can come to market with the wrong label. Less
expensive and low quality products can replace higher quality and more expensive fish or a
species that is illegal to catch may be relabeled under a similar species that is legal to catch.
Within Ireland, estimated levels of seafood fraud for cod (Gadus morhua) at one large retailer
showed that less popular species being sold as cod inflated profits by €400,000–550,000 in 2009
(Miller, 2010). However, because the retailer was not listed it is difficult to determine how much
of an economic incentive mislabeling was in this instance.
Additionally, mislabeling can be done accidentally, or labels that are acceptable in one state
or country may be unacceptable when brought to market in a different state or country (Logan et
al. 2008). The more specific a label is, the less likely for the fish to be mislabeled. One study
found that chum salmon (Oncorhynchus keta) was more often accurately labeled when compared
to the generic label of salmon alone (Hold et al. 2001). Another study found that the broader or
more generic a label was, the easier it was to confuse or use labels interchangeably (Gerson et al.
2008). In Canada, one study found that confusion of what species belonged to what label led to
30-50% of imported toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) to be mislabeled under the code for
seabass. (Gerson et al. 2008)
Regardless of whether the intent to mislabel was profit driven or the result of confusing or
relaxed labelling standards, the negative impacts extend to both human health and conservation
efforts. Within Ireland, for example, 25% of cod samples were found to be mislabeled with
23.7% belonging to a different genus (Miller, 2010). Additionally, around 80% of smoked cod
samples were mislabeled. Likely the rate is smoked samples is because it is harder to detect
mislabeling in highly processed samples (Miller, 2010). In the United States, red snapper
(Lutjanidae) appeared to be the most mislabeled, with studies finding instances of mislabeling
occurring at rates of 63% (Logan, 2008), 77% (Marko, 2004), 78% (Wong, 2008) and 87%
(Warner et al. 2013). Often, the redfish substitution was an Atlantic variety in place of a Pacific
variety or vice versa (Marko, 2004), but one study found 56-58% of mislabeling to be attributed
to a species which was declared overfished by the National Marine Fisheries Service (Logan,
2008). Another study noted red snapper was often priced at $2.93 per pound when compared to
generic redfish which fetched a price of $0.72 per pound, suggesting economic motives (Wong,
2008). Nationwide levels of seafood fraud were found under one study to be 25% (Wong, 2008).
By far, the most comprehensive study in the US was conducted through Oceana which sampled
1215 fish. The Oceana report found a slightly higher level of fraud at 33% (Warner et al. 2013).
Additionally, the Oceana study looked at different markets and found that sushi restaurants were
fraudulent 74% of the time, other restaurants 38% of the time, and grocery stores 18% of the
time (Warner et al. 2013).
Consumers often want to make the most sustainable choice. One survey found 72% of
respondents would be more likely to buy a product if the product had an environmentally
responsible label (Seafood Alliance, 2003). For example, since coming to market, tuna (Thunnus
alalunga) labeled as “dolphin safe” has increased in sales when compared to tuna without the
label (Kaiser, 2006). So when less desirable species are relabeled as more desirable species, they
inflate the catch size of the most desirable species and decrease reporting on species that are not

regulated (Marko, 2004). Sold fish are often used to estimate the stock size of a species.
Mislabeled fish also lead consumers to believe that a species is widely available, making the
stocks seem healthier than it may be (Miller, 2010). Unfortunately, consumer interest in
sustainable choices may have increased instances of mislabeling. In the UK, supermarkets have
competed to get the top spot in the Greenpeace league tables for sustainably caught seafood
(Seafood Choice Alliance, 2003). This competition is only effective if what supermarkets are
selling is accurately labeled. One super-market had 4 of 23 samples labelled as sustainable that
were mislabeled, unsustainable species (Miller et al. 2011). In toothfish stocks, IUU catches
have led to a massive decline in the species (CCAMLR, 2007). Additional harms may be passed
on to consumers as different fish have different levels of mercury, and two individuals were
poisoned by puffer fish ( Takifugu pardalis) which was prepared poorly due to it being labeled as
monk fish (Lophius americanus) (Miller, 2010). The evidence of health risks is further supported
by one report which found that 58% of substitutions carried species-specific health risks (Warner
et al. 2015).
Solutions at the policy level have been proposed to try to stop instances of mislabeling. Most
notably, more specific labeling can be done, removing general labels that capture multiple
species (Logan et al. 2008). In the European Union, products are required to have a standardized
name, method of catch, and location of catch. Whereas in the US, only the name is required to be
on a label (Miller, 2011). Often, generic labels include both sustainably and unsustainably caught
fish, making it impossible for the consumer to make responsible choices (Jacquet and Pauly,
2007). Additionally, when multiple species with different ecological needs are marketed under
one name, it becomes harder to pass regulation that can benefit all of the species grouped under
that label (Logan, 2008). This difficulty is due to differential life history traits such as different
growth rates and maturity rates (Parker et al. 2000). More accurate labels can reflect standard
names or scientific names, but changes to labels can take up to 5 years to implement (Gerson et
al. 2008). Other solutions proposed for the US include establishing a single agency to
standardize labels across state lines, providing more transparent chains of custody, and
developing more cost effective and available tools to test the species of samples that come to
docks (Miller et al. 2010). However, the time and difficulty with implementing fraud solutions
leaves the consumer with few options to know the product they are buying. My study seeks to
examine the difference in markets and see whether community-supported fishery programs allow
for the consumer to receive the most accurately labeled product.
1.2 Community-Supported Fisheries
Following the rise of community-supported agriculture (CSA), many fishermen have
attempted to combine the direct marketing advantages of CSAs with fishing. CSAs have grown
to over 2500 operating businesses in the US (Henderson and Van, 2007), causing the widespread
application of their model into other fields. Community-supported fisheries (CSF) share the
upfront payment and scheduled deliveries that have become a staple of CSAs and apply them to
marine caught fresh fish. In the US, the CSA movement started in 1986 (Tegtmeier and Duffy,
2005), but CSFs started much more recently in 2007 within Maine (Libby, 2011). Because of
their short history, not much is written on what makes a CSF successful or even whether or not

the model is adaptable to fishing. Many risks apply to fisheries that CSA agricultural systems do
not have to worry about, such as mechanical difficulties, regulatory closures, and weather events
which make fishing unsafe (Brinson et al. 2011). Despite the challenges CSFs face, since 2010
the number of CSFs has grown from 14 to 30 following an initial decline (Christoferson, 2015).
The direct marketing model of CSFs has several benefits over traditional markets. When
considering the overall benefits of the CSF model, one should pay attention to the benefits
afforded to fishermen. Often, business owners are largely motivated by profit incentives, and the
CSF model allows for fishermen to receive more money. A study done in North Carolina found
that fish sold through a CSF model could get 33% more revenue for their catch (Stoll et al.
2015). The NC study also found that fishermen who work cooperatively to supply a single CSF
saw 14-18% more revenue for their catch by year- end profit sharing when the profits are divided
out. The profit boost makes CSFs particularly attractive for small scale fishery operations who
currently struggle to get by due to their lack of political power, small market impact and fewer
subsidies when compared to large-scale operations (Ponte et al. 2007). They bring in additional
revenue by providing a market for some fish that does not exist, increasing the variety of species
which can be sold. The catch and release of species that are not marketable presents a time sink
for small scale fisheries. CSFs often receive money upfront when consumers buy shares of the
total catch. Having the money up front allows them to work more collaboratively, share trade
secrets and increase their overall catch (Rountree et al. 2008). Lastly, shares protect fishermen
from price volatility, increasing the value of an upfront payment (Brinson et al. 2011).
Many consumers enjoy how CSFs bring local food to them. CSFs connect with the consumer
through websites, letters, announcements, events, recipes and numerous other methods.
Consumers have become increasingly concerned with where their food comes from (Brinson et
al. 2011). Concern with the origin of food may be in part due to the rise of the locavore
movement. Consumers have begun to believe that local food tends to taste better, be healthier,
and help consumers build relationships with suppliers they can trust (Thomas and Mcintosh,
2013). Additionally, there is a growing movement of consumers who care about the social,
economic and environmental impact of their food (O’Hara and Stagl, 2001). Thus, it is likely that
consumers enjoy CSFs because of the benefits they are perceived to have and consumer’s
increased awareness of their food’s effect on political issues. Finally, many people also enjoy the
connection formed with fishermen (Brinson et al. 2011). This connection has the added benefit
for fishermen of creating potential political allies in the regulatory process. Individuals involved
in CSFs may then be an important ally when pushing for more accurate labelling within
government bodies.
One of the most important aspects of CSFs is their impact on the environment. Many factors
such as the distance food has travelled, fishing methods, and species taken operate differently
under a CSF model. Many CSFs make sustainability one of their stated goals. In a meta-analysis
of CSFs, the largest stated goal was shortening the supply chain, and environmental
sustainability was a stated goal for 41% of CSFs (Bolton and Basurto, 2015). CSFs also had
stated goals of promoting small-scale and low impact fisheries (27%) as well as promoting the
use of underutilized species (14%). The interest in sustainability that some CSF owners have
suggests that some CSF may take conservation and the long-term health of fish stocks into
consideration.

In 2014 the US imported 94% of all fish consumed by Americans (Lowther and liddel,
2015). Distance travelled contributes to the amount of fossil fuels consumed, and local food
should be preferred when possible (Pirog et al. 2001). A study found that the average distance
travelled by seafood from CSFs in the US is 65 Km and 8,812 Km for more traditional markets
(Mcclenachan et al. 2014). A study looked at produce specifically and found that transportation
of food tends to be the most fossil fuel intensive portion of the process from harvest to consumer
(Coley et al. 2009). Cutting down on the distance of food travelled allows for CSFs to have a
much lower carbon impact than traditional markets. However, often CSFs are limited to only
serving their local community and do not ship across states.
CSFs may also be able to aid in reducing the pressure of overfishing. Fishermen participating
in CSFs have an incentive to pass sustainability measures which allow them to compete with
large scale fisheries, making them often a political ally for conservation. Many hurdles exist to
passing strong fishing regulation, and successfully enacted regulation often requires support from
multiple private factions and public institutions (Acheson, 2013). The current incentive of
fishermen is to maximize profit by increasing their overall market share. To achieve maximum
profit, fishermen often try to fish at or near regulatory limits which can lead to overexploitation
(Hilborn et al. 2003). Unfortunately, the response to decreased catches and an increase in the
number of fishermen and industrial fishing has been to catch more (Kasperski and Holland
2013). However, the cooperative nature and profit sharing of the CSF model allow fishermen to
worry less about their overall market share. This cooperation often results in fishermen agreeing
on how to share fish, freeing up individuals to concentrate on reducing costs and improving
market conditions (Hilborn et al. 2005). Additionally, because the shares are bought upfront,
there is less pressure to take as many fish as possible. There has been a decrease in average
trophic level in the last 50 years of fishing, (Pauly, 1998) and CSFs may contribute to the
decrease in trophic level. One study found that the mean trophic level of sold CSF catches was
3.52 compared to 3.29 for more conventional systems (Mcclenachan et al. 2014). Despite this
loss in trophic level, the study also found that CSFs tend to select fish from more highly
abundant stocks (250% of target population size) more frequently than non-CSF fishermen. A
study also created two focus groups—one where the price per fish was based on the number
caught (i.e. fewer fish caught created higher prices) and one where there were no restrictions on
price. Thus, fishermen who were able to get a higher price for less fish were more concerned
about the future health of the fishery (Hopfensitz et al. 2015). If CSFs increase in popularity,
they may have a positive effect on the number of fish that we remove from our oceans.
CSF fishermen tend to use more sustainable fishing gear as well. Some CSFs are incentivized
to use lower impact gear (hook and line, trolling) due to the transparency the CSF has with its
customers (Mcclenachan et al. 2014). This is further supported by research done by Witter
(2012) which suggests that the CSF model may incentivize adopting lower impact gear. The
switch in gear is important because the impact of bottom trawling and similar fishing methods is
much greater than the impact of hook and line gear (Witter, 2012). Not only do they provide all
the above environmental impacts directly, but their connection to the consumer means CSFs can
pass on much of this information as a form of education (Mcclenachan et al. 2014). This
exchange of knowledge means that CSFs may have an additional indirect and positive impact on
the environment.
Hurdles exist in the creation of any community-supported program, but the adaptation of the
CSA model without the consideration of the challenges related to fisheries specifically makes the

creation of a CSF uniquely challenging. While fishermen and farmers have a unique set of skills
that translate well to harvesting the product, many feel unprepared to run a business. Skills such
as marketing and accounting can create barriers to starting a program, and some fishermen and
farmers perceive their lack of skills to be preventative to success. When asked if lack of business
skills was a challenge, 18% of fisherman responded with yes (Bolton and Basurto, 2015).
Additionally, the cost to start up a CSA/F program creates additional burdens. Rather than selling
fish or produce to a supplier, owners must store and supply themselves. In the same study, 14%
believed that the cost of storage was a problem for them. CSFs likely have additional costs
because of the transportation from the ocean to the dock and increased refrigeration that fish
require. Many fishermen and farmers also fear that they may be alienated from traditional
vendors and seen as a competitor. Being cut off from vendors may make it difficult to sell
surplus, participate in events, or harm connections with restaurants.
Those roadblocks alone are challenging, but CSFs must contend with others. First, there have
historically been stricter legal regulations in regards to seafood than produce. In Boston, a ban on
the sale of seafood in a farmers’ market made it difficult to connect to those who would likely be
the largest customer base for CSFs. While farmers’ markets were typically partnering with CSAs
in the same communities, the lack of coverage for CSFs made it a challenging to gain traction
(Tolley and Hall-Arber, 2015). The Boston ban was eventually lifted, but it highlights some of
the fear surrounding seafood.
Additionally, CSFs have a harder time prescribing variety than CSAs. While farmers can
plant in a way that maximizes how variable their crops are, fishermen are at the mercy of
whatever they happen to catch on a particular day (Campbell et al. 2014). The lack of control
over what is caught can be problematic in-so-far as people expect certain familiar fish to be
supplied to them on a weekly basis. Too many unknown or strange fish can turn a customer off
from a CSF. Even worse, a farmer’s output is often determined by how much they plant, while a
fisherman’s is determined by what they can catch. There is increased risk involved if a CSF is
unable to catch enough fish to supply all their shareholders. Often CSFs try to make up the
difference by compensating with more product in other deliveries, (Fensitz et al. 2016) but this
increase in catch can be an additional cost which can hurt a CSF program. Lastly, less seafood is
consumed than produce. Annual seafood consumption in the US in 2012 was roughly 14.5 lb. per
capita in 2014 (Lowther and Liddel, 2015) while annual agricultural consumption was 675 lb.
per capita (Produce for Better Health Foundation, 2015). Fish seem to be a less consistent dinner
food than vegetables, but this differences in per capita consumption could also be due to a higher
supply of agricultural products. Too much fish could lead to individuals cancelling subscriptions
if consumers feel like they are getting more fish than they can eat. Less fish consumption could
represent a potential limit to how much a CSF can increase their profit by when compared to a
CSA.
CSFs’ greater commitment to sustainability, decreased pressure to supply specific
‘popular species’, and the shortened distance that a fisherman’s product travels may be factors
that contribute to lower levels of seafood fraudulence. If consumers can receive a product with
lower instances of fraud and CSFs are able to attract more consumers, CSFs and consumers
could both benefit. My paper seeks to establish both a standardized method for selecting samples
to test as well as establish the difference in instances of fraudulence between CSFs, restaurants,
sushi restaurants, fish markets and grocery stores. I hypothesized that there is a statistical
difference in fish fraud rates between CSFs and other markets.

2.0 Methods
2.1 Selection Methods
Three CSF programs were selected between Maine and New Hampshire—2 in Maine
centered in Portland and the midcoast (Rockland, Rockport and Camden) and 1 in New
Hampshire centered around Portsmouth. Unfortunately, the CSF program in Portland, Maine
cancelled orders mid-May and chose to only supply restaurants. Within each location (Portland,
midcoast and Portsmouth) two fish markets, grocery stores, restaurants and sushi restaurants
each were chosen. To choose which businesses to select for each category, all businesses where
put into a list (i.e. a list of all sushi restaurants in Portland Maine) and assigned a number. A
number was then randomly selected and the corresponding business was selected. The only
requirement for restaurants was that they serve two different types of fish, and menus were
double checked online before attending. Grocery stores were defined as any national or
multistate chain food store, and were distinct from fish markets which were limited to only one
store or were only a statewide chain.
To determine what kinds of fish to buy, I first waited to see what the CSF gave to us. The
two CSFs had different business models. The CSF in New Hampshire followed a similar model
to CSAs. I bought into an 8-week program and received a weekly share of whatever happened to
be caught that week. Each week was also accompanied by an email which explained the fish
being caught and highlighted the fisherman who caught it. The CSF in the midcoast operated by
consumer choice. Each week they would put up a list of what they had in stock and I could select
what I wished to purchase, and the fish would be delivered to a set pick up point. I selected the
first 5 samples from the CSF in New Hampshire to be our target species: dogfish (Squalus
acanthias), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), monkfish, hake (Merluccius bilinearis) and
acadian redfish (Sebastes fasciatus). However, frequently restaurants would have only one or a
few of the CSF fish, leading to a wide range of samples selected (i.e., often sushi restaurants
were limited to tuna and salmon).
2.2 Extraction Methods
Two samples were bought from each business. Roughly a 5-mm2 piece of tissue was cut
from the middle of each fish, and all samples were stored in 70% ethanol in a 1.5-mL test tube at
4°C. Two methods were used to extract DNA. The first method, the NaOH method, took a
roughly .1mm2 piece of each sample in a test tube with 100µl of 50mM NaOH. This mixture was
heated at 95°C for 20 minutes and cooled at 4°C for 10 minutes. Then 10 microliters of 1 M pH
8 Trist HCl was added. The test tube was then centrifuged for 2 minutes to pellet the debris and
the supernatant was pipetted into a clean 1.5 mL test tube. The extracted DNA samples were
stored at -20°C. 648 base pairs from the 5’ region of the CO1 gene were amplified through a
PCR process. The total volumes for the NaOH extraction method PCR reactions were 10
microliters and contained 1 microliter of the extracted DNA, .8 microliters each of the F2 and R2
primers (Ward et al. 2005), 5 microliters of a PCR reaction buffer, and 2.4 microliters of
Nuclease free water. PCR reactions were run in a BIORAD T100 Thermal cycler at 95°C for 30

seconds, 55°C for 30 seconds and 72°C for 30 seconds. This cycle was repeated 29 times. The
PCR products were then run via electrophoresis on a 1% agarose gel for visualization.
The samples that did not successfully amplify via PCR were extracted using the DNeasy Blood
& Tissue Kit created by Qiagen (www.qiagen.com). The extracted DNA was run through the
same PCR process and electrophoresis procedure as outlined above. All samples that were
successfully amplified were purified through the addition of exonuclease 1 shrimp alkaline
phosphatase (Exosap). Samples were sequenced by the DNA Analysis Facility at the University
of Vermont. The sequences were then edited in FinchTV, and the final sequences were entered
into BLAST on GenBank. The BLAST results provided us with a percent match to a species in
the data base and a score evaluating the confidence in the match. To determine whether a species
was mislabeled, acceptable names for species were looked at under the FDA Seafood List
(http://www.accessdata.fda.gov). From the fraud data, I used a one sample t-test comparing the
levels of fraud in CSFs and all other markets to determine if there was a statistical difference
between the two.

3.0 Results
Of the 58 samples, 43 were successfully amplified and sequenced bi-directionally (Table
1). I was not able to get the full length of the COI barcode for all the samples that were
successfully amplified. Some, due to errors in the tail end of either the forward or reverse primer
were sequenced for less than 680 base pairs. The samples with fewer base pairs could represent a
flaw in extraction method as previous studies (Wong et al. 2008, Miller et al. 2011) could get
much higher rates of extraction. A total of 8 samples had a less than 95% match on BLAST. Of
those 8, 6 of them were sequenced with less than 680 base pairs. Additionally, 2 samples were
successfully amplified but could not be sequenced with enough accuracy to match to a species.
The eight samples that had less than a 95% match with a species through BLAST were
cross referenced with the BOLD identification engine (http://www.boldsystems.org/). BOLD
could not return a match for four of the samples, one labeled as haddock from New Hampshire
restaurant 1, one labeled as haddock from Midcoast grocery store 2, one labeled as haddock from
midcoast restaurant 2, and one labeled as salmon from midcoast restaurant 1. In the other 4
instances, the BOLD and BLAST searches revealed the same species.
Of the 41 samples that were successfully amplified and sequenced, 17 of them were
believed to be mislabeled (Table 2). This is a rate of 41.5% of all samples taken—higher than
previous studies which estimate fraudulence rates between 28%-33% (Warner et al. 2013, Wong
et al. 2008). However, the Oceana study notes that there are differences in levels of seafood
fraud regionally in North America, and seafood fraud may be of concern in the Gulf of Maine.
The higher rate of fraud is further supported by yearly reports done by the Boston Globe
(Abelson and Daley, 2012) showing a rate in restaurants of 76%. However, many studies have
relied on self-selection by researchers and volunteers. The self-selection of businesses has the
potential to skew results because researchers may be looking for, or avoiding, businesses that
they believe to be fraudulent. However, a report from the Baltimore Sun notes that instances of

seafood fraud may be on the rise in the US as NOAA cuts investigators and brings fewer cases to
trial (Rentz, 2014).
Of all the markets examined community-supported fishery programs had the lowest level of
fraud. 30% of samples from CSFs were fraudulent compared to 33% of restaurants, 44% of fish
markets, 50% of sushi restaurants, and 57% of grocery stores (Figure 1). When rates of fraud
were compared between CSFs and all other markets, the results showed no statistical difference
between the two (p=0.036). Previous studies that discerned the difference based on market
(Warner et al. 2013) found cases of fraudulence to be 74% in sushi restaurants, 28% in
restaurants and 18% in grocery stores. While our results for restaurants are somewhat consistent,
our sushi results of 50% fraud is much lower. The Warner study did not discern between fish
markets and grocery stores, but both types of businesses were higher than the 18% instances of
fraud in the Warner study. Additionally, the high levels of fraud in both grocery stores and fish
markets suggest that the relationship between vendor and fisherman, and distance the final
product travels may not be influential factors that impact levels of fraud.

4.0 Discussion
4.1 CSF Business Models
Both CSFs had differing business models in terms of how they sold their product to
consumers. The CSF in midcoast Maine sent weekly newsletters out explaining what was caught
each week, and consumers could place an order from this list. The midcoast CSF offered the fish
that it caught on a first come, first serve basis. Of the 5 samples that were bought, on the day of
pick up 2 of the samples were replaced. The order of fresh cod was replaced by a second order of
haddock, and an order of redfish was replaced by scallops (Placopecten magellanicus). These
substitutions were not made known ahead of time, but were clearly labeled on the fish at pick up.
Of the substitutions that were made, one of them was mislabeled. The scallops were found to be
goosefish, more commonly labeled as monkfish. Additionally, what was labeled as monkfish
was found to be haddock, meaning a total of 2 out of 5 (40%) of midcoast CSFs samples were
mislabeled.
The New Hampshire CSF operated similar to the typical CSA model. A share was bought
at the beginning of the summer season, and I did not know in advance what I would be receiving.
Before each week’s pick up, the New Hampshire CSF would outline the species being caught
each week, highlight the fisherman who caught it, and offer up tips on how to cook and prepare
it. Only one of five (20%) samples from the New Hampshire CSF was mislabeled. Acadian
redfish was an equal match with deepwater redfish (Sebastes mentella) and golden redfish
(Sebastes norvegicus). All three species under the FDA Seafood List can be acceptable labeled
as Ocean Perch, but the CSF chose the specific name, Acadian redfish, constituting a case of
fraudulence.
It’s important to note that with only five samples taken from each CSF, the difference
between one and two instances of fraud cannot be claimed to be statistically significant. With

that in mind, the differences between the two different CSFs could be influenced by a number of
factors which warrant a more complete study. First, having an upfront order to dictate amount of
fish to catch per week, may reduce pressure to mislabel. For example, the midcoast CSF may
have different orders week to week, forcing the business to make predictions on demand that
may not align with actual amount of fish ordered. If not enough variety was caught one week, it
may be easier to mislabel samples than to provide multiple substitutions that could turn away
customers from buying future fish. The New Hampshire CSF avoids the problem of selfselection. By receiving the money upfront, and choosing the product for the customer, the CSF
may have less of an incentive to provide the wrong product. Additionally, the bio on the
fisherman and fish being caught by the New Hampshire CSF provides both accountability and
greater liability for mislabeling, creating a positive incentive to accurately label the product.
Conversely, because the New Hampshire CSF had to supply a single species of fish for all
customers each week, they may have more of an incentive to mislabel than the midcoast CSF.
For example, having to supply 600 lbs. of haddock for 600 customers could lead to instances of
mislabeling when one is only able to catch 500 lbs. of haddock a particular week.

4.2 Species Differences
Consistent with previous studies (Warner et al. 2013, Wong et al. 2008, Marko et al.
2004) red fish showed the highest level of fraudulence with two out of three samples (66%)
being mislabeled. The sample of red snapper which was labeled correctly was identified as
Pacific red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus). This Pacific red snapper sample was simply sold as
red snapper with no mention of which ocean the fish came from, but the sales person noted that
the snapper may have come from the Gulf of Mexico. The sales person’s knowledge gap
highlights that some instances of fraud may be due to a lack of knowledge of workers, rather
than an effort to gain more money. Because he had been unsure at the time, I chose not to
include the Pacific red snapper sample as an instance of mislabeling. The substitution of
deepwater redfish (or golden redfish) for the Acadian redfish at the New Hampshire CSF has
some startling ecological impacts. The IUCN redlist finds Acadian redfish to be endangered
(Sobel, 1996) and deepwater redfish to be threatened (Acero et al. 2010). The substitution of an
endangered species for a threatened species, may be seen as positive, but mislabeling underestimates the stock of acadian redfish, and over-estimates the stock of deepwater redfish. This
fraudulence is particularly problematic due to deepwater redfish having life history traits that
may make it more vulnerable to overfishing than other species. Deepwater redfish mature
between 18-23 years, while acadian redfish mature 8-18 years (COSEWIC, 2010).
Unfortunately, slow growing and slow maturing fish are often the most vulnerable to overfishing
(O’Connor, 2015). With the growth rate of deepwater redfish in mind, the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (https://www.neafc.org/) reduced the catch of deepwater redfish to 95,000
tons in 2001 between the contracting parties of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the EU.
Continued exploitation of deepwater redfish that isn’t measured could be contributing to a future
collapse of the species. Additionally, the lack of a genetic divide between North American
populations and European populations (Roques et al. 2002) could mean that a collapse due to

fraud in the US could impact all the Atlantic. Despite their different conservation needs, Acadian
and deepwater redfish are particularly hard to distinguish (COSEWIC, 2010). Their
morphological similarities could be a reason for the existence of their more generic label: ocean
perch. Better tools to distinguish between the two species may help fishermen accurately label
their product.
Tuna had comparatively low levels of fraudulence compared to previous studies (Warner
et al. 2013). Tuna was mislabeled in 3 out of 10 samples. In two of the instances of mislabeling
the tuna was replaced by Seriola quinqueradiata (Amberjack). This species has a common
vernacular name of yellowtail. It is therefore possible that the amberjack was sold under its
vernacular name despite the name not being an acceptable label under the FDA Seafood List.
The confusion of vernacular and accepted names highlights the importance of strict labeling
standards between state and international boundaries. In both instances when Amberjack was
substituted, it came from Boston fish markets, which got the fish from Japanese shipments, and
made its way up to New Hampshire and Midcoast sushi restaurants. Additionally, the more
specific the label was for tuna, the higher levels of fraud. Of the three tuna samples listed as
yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), two were fraudulent. Whereas only one of the seven
samples broadly listed as tuna was fraudulent. Four of the samples listed broadly as tuna were
also the more highly sought after yellowfin tuna.
By far the most commonly available and purchased fish in all three locations was
haddock. Of the 17 samples labeled haddock, six were a different species (35%). Haddock was
also labeled a product other than haddock four out of the total 17 instances of mislabeling, tied
with goosefish. Goosefish and haddock combined made up nearly half of all substitutions. Both
species can easily replace other whitefish with similar textures and taste. Unfortunately, the
haddock and goosefish substitutions may mean that current estimates set a low bar for how much
haddock and goosefish are being removed annually. Much of the haddock was labeled as a
product of Norway, but when the wrong label was attached to haddock, discerning the fish’s
origins became more difficult. The Marine Conservation Society’s annual sustainability list rates
Norwegian haddock as sustainable (https://www.mcsuk.org/ ), but more accurate catch size may
better determine the health of the stock. Goosefish stocks are currently overfished (NMFS,
1997), and additional, unreported exploitation may be particularly harmful to goosefish due to
their slow growth rate and maturity (NOAA, 1999). It is also important to note that the
mislabeled Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) may have been mislabeled due to catch restrictions
placed on the species by the department of commerce. In 2016 the department of commerce set
the total annual catch limit of Atlantic cod to 730 pounds (US Department of Commerce, 2016).
Mislabeling this cod as haddock may have been a way to get around the catch limit and sell more
fish.
Hake showed most consistently the lowest levels of fish fraud across the species sampled.
Of the four samples that successfully amplified and were sequenced for hake, all of them were
correctly labeled. The samples of hake included both white (Urophycis tenuis) and silver hake
(Merluccius bilinearis), which do not share the same general label (FDA Seafood List). The
IUCN red list notes that populations of silver hake in the US and Canada appear to have

stabilized after previous declines and have increased in some areas (Carpenter, 2015). Similarly,
a report done by NOAA notes that white hake does not appear to be overfished (Chang et al.
1999), but the report notes that there may be an overall decline in the stocks of hake that could
become problematic in the future (Sosebee et al. 1998).
A couple of strange results should be noted here. First, three instances of mislabeling
seem unlikely. Yellowfin tuna being mistakenly labeled as haddock (midcoast fish market #2)
seems unlikely given that the product labeled haddock was sold as a fillet at a fish market.
Yellowfin tuna and haddock differ greatly in texture and color. Haddock was also mistakenly
labeled as salmon (midcoast restaurant #1). This substitution seems even more dubious than the
yellowfin replacement, as even the average intelligent seafood consumer could likely tell the two
species apart on the plate visually. The salmon replacement can likely be explained by the
sequence data. This salmon, restaurant sample had an 84% match and was sequenced for 445
base pairs (Table 1). Finally, monkfish was mistakenly labeled yellowfin tuna. Additionally,
there were a total of eight samples of labeled salmon, and only one was successfully amplified,
and this salmon sample appeared to be fraudulent. The lack of salmon amplification could be due
to the primers used. The primers identified by the Ward study (Ward et al. 2005) were used on
Australian fish species with great success, but may be less applicable to the salmon samples that
were gathered.
A few possible factors could explain why the levels of seafood fraud found were so high
and why some substitutions appear to be false. First, the sample size was limited in my study.
With only two CSFs operating in the Gulf of Maine, there was not much variety. With only five
samples taken from either CSF, it is difficult to determine whether their difference in fraudulence
is significant or random. Because there were several species that had unusual matches, I would
suggest that fraudulent samples should be re-extracted and sequenced to check species
identification.
My initial study shows higher levels of seafood fraud than expected. Future studies
should strive to randomize sampling. People who are particularly connected to a region may
avoid places that are more likely to be fraudulent, or individuals seeking fraud may target
businesses that they believe to be mislabeling. Either scenario may skew rates of seafood fraud.
Furthermore, because there were no instances of fraud, future studies looking at the Gulf of
Maine should examine more samples of white fish to determine if hake is consistently more
accurate than other species. Despite the high rate of mislabeling, CSFs showed lower levels of
fraudulence than all other types of markets. However, the results show that, while CSFs had
lower levels of fraud, there was no statistical difference between CSFs and other markets. It is
difficult to evaluate whether the two different CSFs business models caused their levels of
seafood fraudulence to differ, or whether sampling error resulted in different levels of fraud.
Additionally, it is difficult to determine whether the two CSFs sampled are representative of
CSFs as a whole. My report warrants a broader study into levels of fraud across multiple types of
CSFs as well as potential regional differences between CSFs.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful for the guidance of Joe Roman in the planning, execution and writing of this report
as well as Melissa Pespeni for her guidance for much of the lab work. Finally, a special thanks to
Melanie Lloyd for her patience and instruction in the lab.

Works Cited
Abelson J, Daley B. 2012. Re-testing mislabeled fish. Bostonglobe.com.
Acero A., Gordon J.D.M, Murdy E. 2010. Sebastes mentella. The IUCN Red list of threatened species
e.T154816A4640787
Acheson, JM. 2013. Co-management in the Maine lobster industry: a study in factional politics. Conservation and
Society. 11: 60.
Bolton A, Basurto X. 2015. Dock to doorstep: an overview of community supported fishery (csf) programs in the
United States & Canada. Duke Nicholas School of the Environment.
Brinson A, Lee MY, Rountree B. 2011. Direct marketing strategies: the rise of community supported fishery
programs. Marine Policy 35: 542-48.
Campbell L, Boucquey J, Stoll H. 2014. from vegetable box to seafood cooler: applying the community-supported
agriculture model to fisheries. Society & Natural Resources 27:88-106.
Carpenter KE. 2015. Merluccius bilinearis. The IUCN Red list of threatened species e.T16466393A16509787.
Chang S, Morse W, Berrien P. 1999. White hake, Urophycis tenuis, life history and habitat characteristics. United
States. US Department of Commerce. NOAA
Christoferson, J. 2015. Direct marketing of Louisiana shrimp: a cost-earnings analysis. Dissertation Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College.
Coley D, Howard M, Winter M. 2009.Local food, food miles and carbon emissions: a comparison of farm shop and
mass distribution approaches. Food Policy 34. 150-55.
Gerson H, Cudmore B, Mandrak NE, Coote LD, Farr K, Baillargeon G. 2008. Monitoring international wildlife
trade with coded species data. Conservation Biology. 22: 4-7.
EFTEC (Economics for the Environment Consultancy). 2008. Costs of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in
EU fisheries. Economics for Environment Consultancy, ltd., London, UK
Fensitz A, Mantilla C, Miquel‐Florensa J. 2016. Conditional contracts and sustainability: targeting lessons from an
open access fishery. working paper no. TSE‐633.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2007. Stopping illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. FAO
Corporate Document Repository.
Gaines, S. D., and C. Costello. 2013. Forecasting fisheries collapse. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 110: 15859-5860.
Henderson E, Van En R. 2007. Sharing the harvest, revised and expanded. Chelsea Green Publishing. White River
Junction, Vermont.
Hilborn R., Branch TA, Ernst B, Magnusson A, MinteVera C, Scheuerell MD, Valero J. 2003. 2003 State of the
world’s fisheries. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 28: 15.
Hilborn R, Orensanz JM, Parma AM. 2005. Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 360: 47-57.
Hold GL, Russell VJ, Pryde SE, Rehbein H, Quinteiro J, Rey-Mendez M, Sotelo CG, Pe´rez-Martin RI, Santos AT,
Rosa C. 2001. Validation of a PCR–RFLP based method for the identification of salmon species in food products.
European Food Research and Technology 212: 385–389.

Jacquet JL, Pauly D. 2007. The rise of seafood awareness campaigns in an era of collapsing fisheries. Marine Policy
31: 308–313.
Kasperski S, Holland DS. 2013. Income diversification and risk for fishermen. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 110:2076-2081.
Kearney MS, Harris BH, Hershbein B. 2014. Economic contributions of the U.S. fishing industry. Brookings
Institute.
Libby R. 2011. An abundant food system. Marine Policy 20:61-65.
Logan CA, Alter ES, Haupt AJ, Tomalty K, Palumbi SR. 2008. An impediment to consumer choice: overfished
species are sold as Pacific red snapper. Biological Conservation 141: 1591-599.
Lowther A, Liddel M.. 2015. Fisheries of the United States 2014. United States. National Marine Fisheries Service.
Office of Science and Technology.
Marko PB, Lee SC, Rice AM, Rice JM, Gramling TM, Fitzhenry JS, Mcalister G, Harper R, Moran AL. 2004.
Fisheries: mislabelling of a depleted reef fish. Nature 430: 309-10.
Mcclenachan L, Neal BP, Al-Abdulrazzak D, Witkin T, Fisher K, Kittinger JN. 2014. Do community supported
fisheries (CSFs) improve sustainability? Fisheries Research 157: 62-69.
Miller DD, Mariani S. 2010. Smoke, mirrors, and mislabeled cod: poor transparency in the European seafood
industry. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 8: 517-21.
Miller D, Jessel A, Mariani S. 2011. Seafood mislabelling: comparisons of two Western European case studies assist
in defining influencing factors, mechanisms and motives. Fish and Fisheries 13: 345-58.
National Marine Fisheries Service. 1997. Report on the status of fisheries of the United States.
NOAA Technical Memorandum. 1999. Essential fish habitat source document: goosefish, Lophius americanus, life
history and habitat characteristics. NMFS-NE 127.
O'connor CM. 2015. Slow-growing fish have the fastest declines. Journal of Experimental Biology 218: 2986.
O’Hara SU, Stagl S. 2001. Global food markets and their local alternatives: a socio-ecological economic
perspective. Population and Environment 22:533-554.
Oliver R. (2008). All about: global fishing. CNN. Cable News Network.
Parker SJ, Berkeley SA, Golden JT, Gunderson DR, Heifetz J, Hixon MA, Larson R, Leaman BM, Love MS,
Musick JA, O’Connell VM, Ralston S, Weeks HJ, Yoklavich MM. 2000. Management of Pacific rockfish. Fisheries
25: 22–29.
Pauly D, Alder J, Bennett E, Christensen V, Tyedemers P, Watson R. 2003. The future of fisheries. Science 302:
1359-361.
Pauly D.1998. Fishing down marine food webs. Science 279: 860-63.
Pirog RS,Van Pelt T, Enshayan K, Cook, E. 2001. Food, Fuel, and Freeways: An Iowa perspective on how far food
travels, fuel usage, and greenhouse gas emissions. Leopold Center Pubs and Papers. paper 3.
Ponte S, Raakjaer J, Campling L. 2007. Swimming upstream: market access for African fish exports in the context
of WTO and EU negotiations and regulation. Development Policy Review. 25:113– 138.
Produce for Better Health Foundation. 2015. State of the plate: 2015 study on America's consumption of fruit and
vegetables. 1-59.

Rentz, C. 2014. Seafood fraud cases plummet as NOAA cuts investigators. Baltimoresun.com 6.
Roughgarden J, Smith F. 1996. Why fisheries collapse and what to do about it. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 93: 5078-083.
Rountree B, Kitts A, Pinto da Silva P. 2008. Complexities of collaboration in fisheries management: the Northeast
US tilefish fishery. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Fisheries Technical Paper no.
504.
Seafood Choices Alliance. 2003. The marketplace for sustainable seafood: growing appetites and shrinking seas.
Seafood Choices Alliance, Washington, DC.
Sobel J. 1996. Sebastes fasciatus. The IUCN Red list of threatened species e.T20084A9144739.
Stoll JS, Dubik BD, Campbell LM. 2015. Local seafood: rethinking the direct marketing paradigm. Ecology and
Society 20: n. pag.
Sosebee KA, O’Brien L, Hendrickson LC. 1998. A preliminary analytical assessment for white hake in the Gulf of
Maine-Georges Bank region. U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, Northeast Fish Science Center, Woods Hole
lab. ref. doc. 98-05. 96
Tegtmeier EM, Duffy M. 2005. Community supported agriculture (CSA) in the Midwest United States: a regional
characterization. Leopold Center Pubs and Papers. paper 151.
Thomas LN, Mcintosh WA. 2013. It just tastes better when it's in season. Understanding Why Locavores Eat Close
to Home. Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition 8: 61-72.
Tolley B, Hall-Arber M. 2015. Tipping the scale away from privatization and toward community-based fisheries:
policy and market alternatives in New England. Marine Policy 61: 401-09.
United States. Department of Commerce. NOAA. 2016. Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and management
act provisions.
Ward RD, Zemlak TS, Innes BH. 2005. DNA barcoding Australia’s fish species. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society: Biological Sciences 360: 1847–57.
Warner K, Timme W, Lowell B, Hirshfield M. 2013. Oceana study reveals seafood fraud nationwide. Oceana.
Warner K, Mustain P, Lowell B, Geren S, Talmage S. 2015. Deceptive dishes: seafood swaps found
worldwide. Oceana.
Witter A, 2012. Local seafood movements and seafood sustainability in North America. ms thesis, Environmental
Sciences, Policy and Management. University of the Aegean, Lund University
Wong EHK, Hanner RH. 2008. DNA barcoding detects market substitution in North American seafood. Food
Research International 41: 828-37.

Table 1: Seafood samples that were successfully amplified and sequenced, sorted by the type of market and the location where purchased. The table also includes the percent
match on BLAST and the number of nucleotides recovered when sequencing.
Market
CSF

Fish
Market

Grocery
Store

Restaurant

Sushi
Restaurant

Location
NH
NH
NH
NH
NH
Midcoast
Midcoast
Midcoast
Midcoast
Midcoast
NH
NH
NH
Portland
Portland
Portland
Midcoast
Midcoast
Midcoast
NH
NH
NH
Portland
Portland
Midcoast
Midcoast
NH
NH
NH
Portland
Portland
Midcoast
Midcoast

Sold as
Acadian redfish
king whiting
monk fish
haddock
dog fish
haddock
hake
haddock2
monkfish
scallops
haddock
haddock
redsnapper
haddock
hake
redsnapper
haddock
hake
haddock
scrod haddock
cod
haddock
Monk fish
haddock
haddock
haddock
tuna
haddock
tuna
yellowfin tuna
ahi tuna
salmon
haddock

Identified as
Sebastes mentella (deepwater redfish)
Merluccius bilinearis (silver hake)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Squalus acanthia (spiny dogfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Urophycis tenuis (white hake)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Urophycis tenuis (white hake)
Lutjanus peru (Pacific red snapper)
Hippoglossoides platessoides (American plaice or sole)
Urophycis tenuis (white hake)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lutjanus guttatus (spotted rose snapper)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Gadus morhua (Atlantic cod)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Gadus macrocephalus (Pacific cod)
Thunnus obesus (big eye tuna)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)

Fraudulent?
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No

Midcoast
Midcoast
NH
NH
Portland
Portland
Midcoast
Midcoast

haddock
yellowfin tuna
yellowfin tuna
tuna
flounder
tuna
yellowfin tuna
tuna

Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Seriola quinqueradiata (Japanese yellowtail)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Lophius americanus (goose or monkfish)
Thunnus obesus (big eye tuna)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Seriola quinqueradiata (Japanese yellowtail)

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Percent Match on BLAST
98%
87%
100%
100%
98%
98%
92%
96%
100%
97%
100%
100%
96%
98%
97%
99%
94%
94%
100%
99%
99%
95%
100%
100%
95%
92%
100%
84%
95%
99%
100%
84%
99%

Length of gene recovered
680
680
677
679
680
635
680
680
680
393
680
533
680
669
680
680
680
680
676
676
673
634
680
680
680
455
675
622
680
680
675
445
436

92%
99%
99%
99%
94%
99%
100%
99%

455
651
646
674
680
680
678
680

Table 2: Species that were found to be fraudulently labeled and the actual species purchased.
Sample
Code

Sold as

Location

Identified as

N1
NF4
NG3
NR2
NSU1
PF1
PG2
PG3
PSU2
P4
P5

Acadian redfish
Redsnapper
Cod
Haddock
Yellowfin tuna
Haddock
Monkfish
Haddock
Flounder
Monkfish
Scallops

NH CSF
NH Fish Market #2
NH Grocery store #2
NH Restaurant #1
NH Sushi #1
Portland Fish Market #1
Portland Grocery Store #2
Portland Grocery Store #2
Portland Sushi #1
Midcoast CSF
Midcoast CSF

MF1
MF3

Haddock
Haddock

MG1
MR1
MR4
MSU4

Haddock
Salmon
Yellowfin tuna
tuna

MidCoast Fish Market #1
Midcoast Fish Market #2
Midcoast Grocery Store
#1
Midcoast Restaurant #1
Midcoast Restaurant #2
Midcoast Sushi #2

Sebastes mentella or Sebastes norvegicus
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lutjanus guttatus (spotted rose snapper)
Gadus macrocephalus (Pacific cod)
Seriola quinqueradiata (Japanese yellowtail)
Lophius americanus (goosefish or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Gadus morhua (Atlantic cod)
Lophius americanus (goosefish or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lophius americanus (goosefish or monkfish)
Hippoglossoides platessoides (American plaice or
sole)
Thunnus albacares (yellowfin tuna)
Lophius americanus (goosefish or monkfish)
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock)
Lophius americanus (goosefish or monkfish)
Seriola quinqueradiata (Japanese yellowtail)

COMPARISON OF SEAFOOD FRAUD
ACROSS DIFFERENT MARKETS
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Figure 1: The proportion of fraudulence per market. The sample size is listed
above each bar.

